Broken Councils: The Dangerous Politics of Local Government
- By Adejumo Kabir and Ola Bello
The prolonged struggle between the All Progressives Congress (APC) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP)–led state government over the control and legitimacy of local councils has created a governance vacuum at the grassroots in Osun State, Southwest Nigeria.
This paralysis has not only stalled service delivery in all 30 local governments of the state but has also undermined democratic accountability, where it should be most tangible.
While Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution, under Section 7, guarantees a system of local government by democratically elected councils, Osun State’s case since 22 February 2025, illustrates a persistent contradiction, as legal disputes and administrative uncertainty have paralysed council operations, turning grassroots governance into collateral damage in a partisan struggle.
The governance implications are significant. Local governments are responsible for primary healthcare, rural roads, sanitation, markets, and community development services that directly shape human security and economic resilience.
According to residents of the state, routine immunisation outreach, maternal health supervision, and facility maintenance have long been abandoned, leaving citizens in rural communities at risk.
It is more troubling that the crisis in Osun’s local government administration unfolded against the backdrop of a major national reform. On 11 July 2024, the Supreme Court affirmed the financial autonomy of Nigeria’s 774 local governments, reinforcing the constitutional requirement that local councils receive statutory allocations directly, free from state-level interference.
In line with this judgment, the Federal Government subsequently directed all local governments to open accounts with the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to facilitate the direct disbursement of federal allocations.
In Osun State, however, the unresolved dispute over the legitimacy of local council leadership complicated the implementation of this directive. Ongoing political and legal uncertainty has resulted in the withholding of local government allocations, as questions persisted over which officials were legally authorised to receive and manage public funds on behalf of the councils.
Rather than consolidating decentralisation and fiscal accountability, the Osun experience illustrates how unresolved political disputes can undermine well-intentioned institutional reforms.
Comparatively, some states offer instructive counterpoints.
Despite its own challenges, Lagos State has maintained relative regularity in local government elections and administrative continuity, allowing councils to function as stable service-delivery units. Edo State’s reforms to clarify local government tenure and administrative oversight have also reduced prolonged governance vacuums.
These examples suggest that political will and institutional clarity, rather than constitutional ambiguity alone, determine local government functionality.
To reverse this trajectory and safeguard grassroots governance, major reforms are critical.
Firstly, local government institutions cannot be allowed to oscillate with political disputes or remain hostage to unresolved power struggles, hence, the judiciary must move decisively to end the governance limbo through clear pronouncements which must be implemented promptly, uniformly, and in good faith, not selectively interpreted or delayed to serve political ends. Institutional stability depends on respect for the rule of law, not political convenience. Where legal ambiguities exist, the state has a duty to clarify them through lawful administrative action rather than allowing uncertainty to paralyse service delivery.
Secondly, the current operation of the State Joint Local Government Account (SJLGA) in Osun is not in line with the Supreme Court judgment affirming the financial autonomy of Nigeria’s 774 local governments. Osun State must recalibrate its fiscal governance framework to reflect this ruling by ensuring that statutory FAAC allocations flow to local governments transparently, predictably, and without political filtration.
Lastly, regular, credible local government elections are not optional administrative exercises, they are constitutional obligations and the primary source of democratic legitimacy at the grassroots. Osun State must therefore end the cycle of delayed elections, legal ambiguities, and ad hoc caretaker arrangements that have normalised unelected local governance.
The State Independent Electoral Commission (SIEC) must be strengthened legally, financially, and operationally, to conduct timely, transparent, and competitive local government elections in strict adherence to established electoral timelines. Electoral calendars should be publicly fixed and insulated from partisan manipulation, with deviations permitted only under clearly defined and legally justifiable circumstances. Caretaker committees should be treated as exceptional, short-term stopgaps, not governance substitutes. Their prolonged use erodes accountability, weakens citizen participation, and undermines the very essence of local democracy.
Local governments are the frontline institutions through which citizens experience the state. When they fail, democracy fails quietly but decisively. Restoring functional local government administration in Osun is therefore not just a political settlement; it is a governance imperative.
- Adejumo Kabir Adeniyi is a senior researcher at Good Governance Africa-Nigeria. He is an expert with many years of experience in community development work and governance accountability sector. Before joining GGA, Adejumo worked at Premium Times and HumAngle Media, two of Nigeria’s biggest newspapers specialising on conflict and accountability reporting.
- Dr Bello is the Executive Director for Good Governance Africa (GGA). He has extensive experience in mining governance and economic transformation. He has been a member of the Technical Working Group for the implementation of the African Mining Vision since 2011, supporting pan-Africa organizations, including the African Union, the AfDB, UNDP and UNECA.
The opinions expressed in this publication are solely those of the author. It does not represent the editorial position or opinion of OSUN DEFENDER.
